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Abstract—Security surveillance is one of the most impor-
tant issues in smart cities, especially in an era of terrorism.
Deploying a number of (video) cameras is a common
surveillance approach. Given the never-ending power of-
fered by vehicles to metropolises, exploiting vehicle traffic
to design camera placement strategies could potentially
facilitate security surveillance. This article constitutes the
first effort toward building the linkage between vehicle
traffic and security surveillance, which is a critical problem
for smart cities. We expect our study could influence
the decision making of surveillance camera placement,
and foster more research of principled ways of security
surveillance beneficial to our physical-world life. Code has
been made publicly available1.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security surveillance is one of the most important
issues in smart cities. Due to the continuous growth of
cities in size and complexity, keeping cities safe becomes
critical to attracting skilled people and investments nec-
essary for economic growth and development. Com-
pounded by terrorism, cities, especially metropolises,
have to carefully conduct security surveillance.
To fight against the adversary, deploying a number
of (video) cameras is a common surveillance approach,
which has gained prominence in policy proposals on
combating terrorism [1]. At first glance, camera place-
ment is a trivial task that could be achieved by simply
purchasing a huge number of cameras. However, sub-
ject to the economic budget, cameras cannot be placed
unlimitedly. Additionally, as the camera resolution in-
creases, the network bandwidth (and the storage and
processing overhead) needed for real-time transmission
∗Equal contribution.
†Corresponding author.
1github.com/yihui-he/Vehicle-Traffic-Driven-Camera-Placement
of the recorded videos to the data center is considerably
large. For example, the latest generation of IP cameras
require up to 10 Mbps bandwidth per camera [2]. Theses
constraints will become more significant as cities grow
in size and complexity.
Exploiting vehicle traffic from cyber transportation
space to strategically place cameras could potentially
facilitate physical-world security surveillance. For exam-
ple, criminals and terrorists may drive vehicles before
and after security events occur; vehicles have become
terrorists’ favorable weapons, such as the 2017 West-
minster attack [3]. Thus, monitoring vehicles has great
potential in collecting security event evidence.
As a straightforward strategy, one may place cameras
in busy (e.g., more traffic) regions, where the adversary
tends to commit crimes or large-scale threatening terror-
ism activities. However, this strategy may fail to cover
vehicles that never enter busy regions. Intuitively, a good
strategy should allow distinct vehicles visible to cameras
as many as possible, and make each vehicle exposed
to cameras frequently. The former requirement is very
important because the invisibility of a vehicle to cameras
means the lack of surveillance. The latter requirement
encourages more information to be collected for each
vehicle, making it more likely to recognize the trajectory
of a vehicle.
After placing the camera infrastructure, we also ex-
pect the placed cameras to be of high resolution for
high-quality video data. However, as the number of
placed cameras grows, the overhead of handling the
data (e.g., transmission, storage and processing) may
become intractable. That is, despite the large population
of placed cameras, the number of cameras that could be
of high resolution simultaneously is limited. Determining
which cameras should be of high resolution is a non-
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trivial task. If a fixed set of cameras are configured as
high resolution, the adversary may evade these cameras
(when committing crimes), thereby eliminating high-
quality crime evidence.
Focusing on these problems, this article investi-
gates vehicle traffic driven security camera infrastructure
placement, and formulates it as a group of submodular
set function optimization problems, which could be
gracefully solved by the greedy algorithm with theoret-
ical lower bounds. We propose five different placement
strategies that differ in designing goals. Also, we design
a randomized camera resolution upgrading framework
based on game theory, with the purpose of breaching the
practical overhead barrier of handing video data. Using
the carefully designed randomized strategy, we can deter
the sophisticated adversary with maximal utility.
Our work constitutes the first effort toward building
the linkage between vehicle traffic and security surveil-
lance, which is a critical problem for smart cities. We
expect our study could influence the decision making of
surveillance camera placement, and foster more research
efforts towards principled ways of security surveillance
beneficial to our physical-world life.
II. VEHICLE TRAFFIC DRIVEN PLACEMENT
STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING SURVEILLANCE
INFRASTRUCTURE
A. Problem Description
Let V be the set of vehicles under surveillance and
v∈V be a vehicle. Suppose v is equipped with a position
sensor. The coordinates include latitude and longitude.
Specifically, the data from the sensor comprises the
following fields: (vehicle ID, time, latitude, longitude),
where the vehicle ID uniquely identifies a vehicle.
The metropolis is characterized as a rectangle uniquely
identified by its maximum latitude, minimum latitude,
maximum longitude, and minimum longitude. The rect-
angle is divided into small blocks with a size of l× l
(e.g., 50m× 50m), resulting in a set of blocks denoted
by Ω. The advantages of dividing the map into blocks
are two-fold, namely, map-independent (applicable for
all metropolises) and exactly covering the entire map
(unlike circulars).
Our goal is to find a subset of blocks C ⊆Ω to place
(super) cameras, so that the security surveillance utility
could be maximized. The cardinality of C is the number
of blocks that we select to place cameras. Let N denote
the maximum number of blocks where we can afford
to place cameras. Obviously, we have |C| ≤ N. Note
that only a block with GPS records can be selected for
camera placement, thereby containing at least one road.
B. Placement Strategies
For all strategies, we denote the objective function by
F(C).
1) S1—Maximum Unique Vehicles: This strategy se-
lects a subset C ⊆ Ω so that the number of unique
vehicles crossing (at least one) blocks in C is maximized,
formally expressed as
argmax
C
F(C) = ∑
v∈V
Iv(C) (1)
where Iv(C) equals one if v has crossed at least one
block in C; otherwise Iv(C) equals 0. Such a strategy
maximizes the visibility space (i.e., the total number of
unique vehicles) of security surveillance.
2) S2—Maximum Vehicle Traffic: This strategy differs
from S1 in that it maximizes the amount of vehicle
traffic (rather than unique vehicles) crossing blocks in
C. Similarly, it is
argmax
C
F(C) = ∑
v∈V
Tv(C) (2)
where Tv(C) denotes the amount of traffic of blocks in
C contributed by v, and could be measured by the total
time when v stays inside C. Tv(C) can be calculated by
∑c∈C Tv(c), where Tv(c) denotes the total time when v
stays in c, depending on the times when v enters and
leaves c. S2 maximizes the total visible time to cameras
of all vehicles (i.e., summing up the time each vehicle
under surveillance).
3) S3—Minimum Mean OITR (Out-Camera to In-
Camera Time Ratio): This strategy minimizes the mean
OITR across all vehicles. The OITR of a vehicle repre-
sents the proportion of time when a vehicle is outside the
visible scope of cameras. Intuitively, smaller mean OITR
across all vehicles indicates better security surveillance.
S3 is equivalent to the maximization problem:
argmax
C
F(C) =Φ−∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C)+1
−1
)
/|V | (3)
where S is the measurement time. S3 does not take the
uniqueness of cameras into consideration. Therefore, it
encourages more unique vehicles visible to (whichever)
cameras, and meanwhile each vehicle visible to cameras
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as long as possible. Note that Tv(C) is increased by one
to avoid S being divided by zero, and Φ is a constant
derived from F( /0) = 0 so that we have F(C) ≥ 0. The
same operation exists for S4 and S5.
4) S4—Minimum Mean ACIs (Average Camera-Hit
Intervals): We define the ACIs to represent the average
time interval to hit a camera for a vehicle. Formally, we
minimize the mean ACIs across all vehicles, and S4 is
equivalent to:
argmax
C
F(C) =Φ−∑
v∈V
S
Hv(C)+1
/|V | (4)
where Hv(C) denotes the number of times that vehicle
v hits (whichever) cameras along its trajectory during
the measurement time S. S4 encourages more unique
vehicles visible to (whichever) cameras, and meanwhile
each vehicle to hit cameras more frequently.
5) S5—Minimum Mean AUIs (Average Unique-
Camera-Hit Intervals): We further adapt S4 by con-
sidering the uniqueness of cameras that a vehicle hits.
Accordingly, we define the AUIs to represent the average
time interval to hit a new camera for a vehicle. Similar
to S4, we minimize the mean AUIs across all vehicles,
and S5 is defined as:
argmax
C
F(C) =Φ−∑
v∈V
S
Uv(C)+1
/|V | (5)
where Uv(C) denotes the number of unique cameras that
vehicle v hits during the measurement time S. Uv(C) is
calculated as the number of unique blocks in C that v
crosses. S5 encourages more unique vehicles visible to
(whichever) cameras, and meanwhile each vehicle to hit
more new cameras.
C. Solving Optimal Placement Strategies
All the above strategies are formulated as maximiza-
tion problems under the constraint |C| ≤ N. To find a
subset of blocks C ⊆ Ω to place cameras so that F(C)
can be maximized, we need to solve these maximization
problems, which are NP-hard.
Each strategy differs in the objective function F(C).
However, this does not necessarily mean that we have to
solve these strategies in five different manners. Instead,
all these maximization problems could be gracefully
solved with a greedy algorithm (GA) because of their
non-increasing monotony and submodularity [4,5]. The
non-increasing monotony means that, for any two sets
C1,C2 ⊆ Ω and C1 ⊆ C2, we have F(C1) ≤ F(C2).
Apparently, the functions defined in S1∼S5 are non-
decreasing.
The submodularity means that a non-decreasing set
function has the property of diminishing returns when a
single element c is added to an input set C, as compared
to c is added to an input set that is a subset of C.
Specifically, for a non-decreasing function, such as F(C)
defined in S1∼S5, given every two sets C1,C2 ⊆Ω and
C1 ⊆ C2, and a new block c ∈ Ω \C2, the submod-
ular property is equivalent to F(C1 ∪ {c})− F(C1) ≥
F(C2∪{c})−F(C2). This means smaller sets have more
function value increment when they are added with a
new block. It is easy to prove the the submodularity for
S1 and S2. The proof of the submodularity for S3∼S5 is
included in the appendix. Interested readers are referred
to [5] for a comprehensive survey of submodularity.
According to [4], submodularity allows us to derive a
solution lower bounded by 1−1/e≈ 63% of the optimal
solution. GA runs for at most N rounds to obtain a set
C of size |C| ≤ N. In each round, it selects a new block
c ∈ Ω \C maximizing the reward gain, δc(C) = F(C∪
c)− F(C), and inserts c into C. This process repeats
until |C|= N or δc(C) = 0.
III. RANDOMIZING CAMERA RESOLUTION
UPGRADING FOR HIGH-QUALITY SURVEILLANCE
As the number of the affordable cameras grows, the
overhead of handling the videos (e.g., transmission,
storage and processing) may be impossible to satisfy,
especially when high-resolution video is desired for
high-quality crime evidence [6]. In other words, only
a limited number of cameras could be of high resolution
simultaneously.
Determining which cameras should be of high res-
olution is non-trivial. If a fixed set of cameras are
configured as high resolution, the adversary may evade
them deliberately (when committing crimes), thereby
eliminating high-quality crime evidence. Therefore, we
propose to randomly choose a set of placed cameras and
upgrade their resolution, with an attempt to deter the
adversary by making him feel that any camera might be
of high resolution.
A. A Game-theoretic Formulation
Since different blocks differ in their priorities to be
monitored, or to be the target blocks where criminal
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activities are committed, we take into account the im-
portance of different blocks when designing the random-
ized strategy. Meanwhile, the adversary aims to evade
the surveillance of high-resolution cameras, while the
defender (e.g., police) tries to observe the adversary.
To describe such confrontation, we leverage the Stack-
elberg security game (SSG) to design the strategy [7].
SSG is well-suited to adversarial reasoning for security
resource allocation problems and has been adopted in
many applications, such as US Federal Air Marshal
Service [8].
A standard SSG has two players, a leader and a
follower. Each player has its own set of pure strategies
to select. The leader and the follower act sequentially as
follows.
Step 1. The leader (i.e., defender) commits to a mixed
strategy. The mixed strategy allows the leader to play a
probability distribution over pure strategies, maximizing
the leader’s utility.
Step 2. The follower (i.e., adversary), as a response,
selects a pure strategy that optimizes his utility after
inspecting and learning the mixed strategy chosen by
the leader.
We consider a threat model wherein the adversary is
sophisticated. Specifically, the adversary can inspect and
learn the monitor’s mixed strategy (i.e., the probability
distribution), and select the pure strategy that maximizes
his utility, i.e., a best response adversary.
On the other hand, the defender is forward-looking.
That is, she takes into account the adversary’s threat
model when designing strategies, thereby making her
strategy robust against the sophisticated adversary.
Although the adversary can learn the defender’s mixed
strategy, he cannot predict which specific pure strategy
the defender would adopt at the time of his scheduled
criminal activities.
B. Player Strategies
A pure strategy of the defender is a set of cameras
whose resolution can be upgraded simultaneously. Our
aim is to deter the adversary by randomly upgrading the
resolution of the placed cameras, and thus the adversary
committing crimes in blocks without cameras are not
considered. Therefore, a pure strategy of the adversary
is a set of blocks with placed cameras.
C. Utility Functions
Consider that the adversary commits crimes in the ith
block ci. If ci is covered by the defender’s pure strategy,
the defender receives reward Rdi . Otherwise, the defender
receives penalty Pdi . Similarly, the adversary receives
penalty Pai in the former case, and reward R
a
i in the latter
case.
The reward that the defender monitors a specific block
can be assigned according to the importance of the block,
such as the amount of vehicle traffic, the number of
unique vehicles, and historical crime activity severity,
and so forth. The penalty that the adversary selects a
block can be measured in the same way.
Let Γ j denote the jth defender pure strategy, and Ai j
denotes the coverage indicator of Γ j on ci, where Ai j = 1
for ci ∈ Γ j, and Ai j = 0 for ci /∈ Γ j. Let J be the number
of defender pure strategies. The number of adversary
pure strategies is N, the (maximum) number of blocks
where cameras are placed. We denote the probability of
the defender choosing pure strategy Γ j by a j, and we
have
J
∑
j=1
a j = 1 (6)
The marginal probability xi for the defender to upgrade
ci (i.e., upgrade the resolution of the camera in ci) can
be calculated by
xi =
J
∑
j=1
a jAi j, i = 1,2 . . . ,N (7)
We denote (a1,a2, . . . ,aJ) by a, and (x1,x2, . . . ,xN) by
x, where x is determined by a.
The defender’s expected utility on upgrading ci can
be expressed as
Udi (xi) = xiR
d
i +(1− xi)Pdi (8)
and the adversary’s expected utility on committing
crimes in ci is:
Uai (xi) = xiP
a
i +(1− xi)Rai (9)
D. Mixed Strategy against A Best Response Adversary
We formally define the objective function with con-
straints to maximize the defender’s utility against a best
response adversary. Let us first consider a sophisticated
adversary who takes the best response, i.e., selecting the
block to commit crimes so to maximize his utility. In this
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case, the probability that the adversary selects ci equals
Bi =
{
1 Uai (xi)≥Uaj (x j),∀ j = 1, . . . ,J
0 otherwise
(10)
This means that the adversary knows the marginal prob-
ability xi for the defender to upgrade ci, and he selects
the target with maximal expected utility. Consequently,
the utility functions of the adversary and the defender
can be expressed as
Ua =
N
∑
i=1
BiUai (xi) (11)
Ud =
N
∑
i=1
BiUdi (xi) (12)
Simultaneously, the defender selects an optimal mixed
(i.e., randomized) strategy in consideration of the sophis-
ticated adversary’s best response. The defender maxi-
mizes her utility Ud as
max
a
N
∑
i=1
BiUdi (xi) (13)
Substituting (8), we rewrite (13) as
max
a
N
∑
i=1
Bi
(
xiRdi +(1− xi)Pdi
)
(14)
To calculate the defender’s optimal strategy, the fol-
lowing problem P1 needs to be solved.
P1:

max
a
N
∑
i=1
Bi
(
xiRdi +(1− xi)Pdi
)
subject to xi =
J
∑
j=1
a jAi j, ∀i
J
∑
j=1
a j = 1
0≤ a j ≤ 1, ∀ j
(15)
Problem P1 cannot be directly solved since Bi defined
in (10) contains an underlying “if-then” logical rela-
tionship. Instead, after removing the “if-then” logical
relationship, P1 can be readily solved by the branch-
and-cut algorithm [9].
The defender finally adopts the mixed strategy below.
Mixed Strategy: play Γ jwith probability a j
where a j ∈ a is the solution of problem P1
j = 1,2, . . . ,J
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Dataset Description
The data contains one-week GPS trajectories of
10,357 taxis in Beijing, with more than 15 million
position records and 9 million kilometers total distance
of the trajectories [10]. We remove the outliers along the
GPS trajectories of a vehicle, including points indicating
an impossible speed, and points that significantly deviate
the moving average. Finally, we identify 0.28% of all the
GPS points as outliers.
We then divide Beijing into a set of blocks Ω with a
size of 50m× 50m, yielding the total number of such
blocks |Ω| = 14,473,089. We can place cameras in
blocks where vehicles arrive. There are 438,674 such
blocks, denoted as R⊂Ω.
B. Performance of Camera Placement Strategies
1) Metrics: Larger values of these metrics indicate
better security surveillance.
• UCR (Unique Vehicle Coverage Ratio). The ratio of
observed unique vehicles to all vehicles, calculated
by ∑v∈V Iv(C)/∑v∈V Iv(R).
• VCR (Vehicle Traffic Coverage Ratio). The ratio of
traffic observed by all cameras to the total amount
of traffic, which equals ∑v∈V Tv(C)/∑v∈V Tv(R).
• VIT (Vehicle In-Camera Time). The total amount
of time when a vehicle v is under surveillance, i.e.,
Tv(C)
• VCH (Vehicle Camera-Hits). The number of times
that v hits cameras along its trajectory, calculated as
∑c∈C I′v({c}), where I′v({c}) is the number of times
v hits block c ∈C.
• VUH (Vehicle Unique-Camera-Hits). The number
of unique cameras v hits, calculated as ∑c∈C Iv({c}),
where Iv({c}) equals one if v hits c; otherwise zero.
2) Result Analysis: For each strategy, we calculate
UCR, VCR and VIT by varying the number of cameras
N from 1 to 10,000. UCR and VCR reveal the proportion
of unique vehicles and vehicle traffic that could be
covered under each strategy, respectively. Additionally,
we calculate VIT, VCH and VUH for each vehicle to
have a closer look at the total amount time when a
vehicle is under surveillance, the total number of cameras
that a vehicle hits, and the total number of unique
cameras that a vehicle hits, respectively.
Fig. 2 depicts the performance of all strategies. Gen-
erally, the metrics increase slower as N becomes larger,
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(a) S1: top 563 blocks to place cameras covering all (taxi) vehicles
.
(b) S2: top 563 blocks to place cameras maximizing VCR.
Fig. 1. Example camera placement heatmaps derived using one-week taxi data in Beijing based on strategy S1 and S2.
meaning that all strategies accomplish diminishing re-
turns. Particularly, all metrics rise rapidly before N
reaches 200, accounting for no more than 0.05% of all
possible blocks where we can place cameras (i.e., R).
As Fig. 2a shows, a very small proportion of cameras
need to be placed to cover the vast majority of vehicles.
Specifically, all strategies exhibit a rapid rise in UCR to
at least 90% before N reaches 200, indicating that we
need to place cameras in no more than 0.05% blocks
to cover at least 90% vehicles. Moreover, all strategies
except S2 achieve a 100% UCR before N reaches 900
(i.e., 0.2% of R), while S2 almost has no increasing
returns after N = 4,000.
Insight 1. To cover all vehicles, we need to place
cameras only in 0.2% blocks at most using S1, S3, S4, S5.
Among these strategies capable of covering all vehicles,
S1 could cover all vehicles with the smallest N (i.e., the
most quickly), followed by S3, S4, and S5 in ascending
order. However, S2 could hardly converge to cover all
vehicles as N increases.
This insight reveals the existence of a small set of
“core” blocks covering all vehicles. Fig. 1a shows the
minimum set of such “core” blocks derived from strategy
S1. Meanwhile, S2 that only maximizes vehicle traffic
coverage results in slow or even incomplete vehicle
coverage.
Fig. 2b demonstrates the vehicle traffic coverage ratio,
where VCR rises roughly linearly as N increases for
all strategies exclusive of S1. Among all strategies, S2
exhibits the largest growth rate, followed by S4, S3, S5,
and S1. Fig. 1b shows top 563 blocks where we can place
cameras to maximize VCR using S2. We observe that the
blocks in Fig. 1b are significantly less geographically
dispersed than those in Fig. 1a. The growth rates of S3
and S4 are comparable. S1 almost has no increasing
returns after N = 200, implying that an emphasis on
vehicle coverage may fail to maximize traffic coverage.
Insight 2. Although S1 achieves the best performance re-
garding UCR, its performance regarding VCR degrades
drastically to an extent where no increasing returns is ac-
complished when we invest more cameras after N = 200.
In contrast, S3∼S5 achieve significant increasing returns
regarding VCR as N increases. Although their increasing
returns are not as fast as that of S2, they can converge
to cover all vehicles quickly while S2 cannot.
This insight reveals that our proposed strategies
S3∼S5 can achieve well-balanced performance between
UCR and VCR. This is because they encourage more
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Fig. 2. The performance metrics over the number of cameras N of different placement strategies.
vehicles under surveillance while simultaneously con-
sidering more (unique) camera hits and traffic coverage
per vehicle.
Fig. 2c presents mean VCH across all vehicles, which
has similar trend as VCR. This reflects that the number
of camera hits is positively correlated to in-camera
time. For the same reason, VIT exhibits the same trend
as VCH. We therefore omit the plot of mean VIT.
Among all the strategies, S2 achieves the best average
surveillance performance (i.e., longer in-camera time,
more camera-hits) per vehicle, though it may result in
slow or even incomplete vehicle coverage. Despite the
performance degradation in mean VCH compared to S2,
strategies S3∼S5 achieve median values of VIT and
VCH across all vehicles comparable to S2, while simul-
taneously exhibiting much smaller standard deviation of
VIT and VCH. Furthermore, the Gini coefficient of VCH
for S2 is larger than that for S3∼S5, confirming that
S3∼S5 achieve relatively fairer surveillance across all
vehicles regarding in-camera time and camera hits than
S2.
Insight 3. S3∼S5 achieve more balanced surveillance
across all vehicles in terms of in-camera time and
camera hits than S2, avoiding little surveillance of some
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vehicles and too much surveillance (possibly unneces-
sary) of others. Therefore, they provide relatively fairer
security surveillance services across all vehicles.
Fig. 2d presents the performance of mean VUH (i.e.,
the number of unique vehicles that a vehicle hits) across
all vehicles. We observe that S5 achieves the largest
mean VUH, while S1 has no increasing returns after N
reaches 200. The remaining strategies exhibit moderate
performance worse than that of S5. Actually, S5 encour-
ages deploying cameras in the blocks where different
blocks along a vehicle’s trajectory can be observed
as many as possible, and meanwhile vehicles can be
observed as many as possible. In this case, a vehicle is
expected to be observed in more different blocks, thereby
beneficial to capturing more places where a vehicle has
ever been. This is important in security surveillance that
prefers the knowledge on the places where a vehicle has
been.
Insight 4. S5 is a strategy in favor of capturing more
places where a vehicle has ever been. Other strategies
perform worse than S5 regarding mean VUH.
C. A Case Study of Randomized Resolution Upgrading
To demonstrate the performance of randomized reso-
lution upgrading based on game theory, we consider a se-
curity surveillance scenario where N = 10,000 cameras
are placed while only 1,000 cameras could be of high
resolution. Suppose the surveillance focuses on criminal
(or terrorist) activities that tend to be conducted at places
that are generally with more vehicle traffic (so to make
more serious consequences). We thus measure the impor-
tance of a block ci according to its amount of traffic in
the dataset, which is calculated as T (ci) =∑v∈V Tv({ci}).
We consider that the defender and the adversary
play a zero-sum game. That is, each player’s gain (or
loss) of utility is exactly balanced by the losses (or
gains) of the utility of the other player(s). Formally,
we set Rdi +P
a
i = 0, R
a
i +P
d
i = 0. Obviously, we have
Ud +Ua = 0. Meanwhile, the importance values of
blocks are normalized through dividing each value by
the maximum value. Therefore, we have Rdi ,R
a
i ∈ [0,1],
and Pdi ,P
a
i ∈ [−1,0]. Combining (8), (9), (11), and (12),
it is easy to know Ua,Ud ∈ [−1,1].
Before realizing randomized resolution upgrading, we
randomly generate 1,000 defender pure strategies in
total. The union of these pure strategies cover all the
placed cameras to ensure that the resolution of any
camera has a chance to be upgraded. On the other hand,
an adversary pure strategy is a block where he commits
crimes, the number of which equals 10,000.
Table I shows the defender utility (i.e., Ud) when
the defender adopts the mixed strategy, in comparison
to adopting two baseline defender strategies, namely,
uniform strategy and best strategy. The uniform strategy
means the defender adopts a pure strategy uniformly
at random. The best strategy allows the defender to
constantly adopt the pure strategy that contains the
most important block. If there are multiple such pure
strategies, the defender selects the one maximizing her
utility.
From the table, we see that the mixed strategy achieves
significantly larger utility than the baseline strategies, no
matter which placement strategy (S1∼ S5) is employed
to place the camera infrastructure. Such a result indicates
that, once the importance of each block is defined, one
can derive the mixed strategy that outperforms baseline
strategies and maximizes the defender utility against
a sophisticated adversary. This case study implies the
feasibility that the security police randomly selects a
set of cameras and upgrades their resolution for high-
quality video evidence based on the proposed security
game model.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Customizing Security Surveillance
Different types of vehicles may require different
surveillance priorities. For example, compared with in-
dividual cars, taxis (as a public space) and school buses
usually need higher surveillance priorities. Although we
do not distinguish between different vehicle types, every
vehicle v can be assigned a personalized weight wv
indicating its surveillance priority, where larger values
of the weight indicate higher surveillance priorities. One
can also assign weights to vehicles according to their
reputation scores derived from social data like accident
records and vehicle owners’ criminal records. Vehicles
with more accident records, or whose owners have more
criminal records, would be assigned higher weights.
The weight wv can be directly used as a multiplier of
the parameters in the proposed strategies. For example,
Iv(C) could be replaced by wvIv(C), and so do Tv(C),
Hv(C) and Uv(C). This keeps the non-decreasing sub-
modular property of F(C). Therefore, GA remains appli-
cable. By incorporating individual vehicle information,
we can customize placement strategies as needed, with
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TABLE I
THE DEFENDER’S EXPECTED UTILITY AGAINST A BEST-RESPONSE ADVERSARY UNDER DIFFERENT DEFENDER STRATEGIES (I.E., MIXED
STRATEGY, UNIFORM STRATEGY, AND BEST STRATEGY) AND DIFFERENT CAMERA PLACEMENT STRATEGIES.
placement
utility defender
mixed strategy
baseline strategies
uniform strategy best strategy
S1 -0.07313 -0.74600 -0.19582
S2 -0.13279 -0.81400 -0.50654
S3 -0.10210 -0.77800 -0.47290
S4 -0.20533 -0.81000 -0.68853
S5 -0.12091 -0.82800 -0.49978
a bias toward vehicles with higher surveillance priorities
and lower reputation scores.
B. Privacy Issues
Determining strategies for customizing security
surveillance not only anticipates GPS data sharing from
vehicles, but also rely on other social data sources
helpful to security surveillance. The data sharing may in-
troduce privacy issues, which however could be resolved
by data obfuscation techniques (e.g., obfuscating vehicle
IDs). Whenever a security event occurs, the obfuscated
data (e.g., vehicles IDs) would again be recovered from
collected (video) data recorded by cameras using plate
number recognition techniques, after being authorized by
privileged authorities. Additionally, tracking individual
vehicles by cameras may also have privacy issues. Thus,
we suggest the public should be notified of placed
cameras, and meanwhile the collected video data MUST
be strictly managed by authorities according to law.
VI. RELATED WORK
Transportation Monitoring. Transportation monitoring
is a broad area closely related to urban computing
tasks like energy and transportation optimization (e.g.,
ridesharing, speed control), road traffic monitoring (e.g.,
travel time estimation), urban environment modeling
(e.g., PM 2.5 air quality) [11]. Transportation monitoring
undoubtedly accelerates the operation efficiency of a
metropolis. However, none of the existing studies re-
garding transportation monitoring exploits vehicle traffic
to select camera placement blocks in favor of security
surveillance.
Physical-World Security Surveillance. Recent years
have witnessed a rising trend towards game-theoretic
urban security patrolling on roads [12]. Specifically,
an adversary assigns different values to reaching (and
damaging or destroying) one of multiple targets (e.g.,
buildings). A defender can allocate resources to capture
the attacker before he reaches a target. To prevent at-
tacks, security forces can schedule checkpoints on roads
to detect adversaries. Different from these studies, we
leverage game theory to control placed cameras. More-
over, camera placement complements road patrolling,
because the adversaries missed by the road checkpoints
could be further inspected by placed cameras.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article explored the linkage between vehicle
traffic and camera placement in favor of security surveil-
lance from a network perspective. We proposed differ-
ent camera placement strategies that facilitate security
surveillance. Using real-world data from a metropolis,
we demonstrated that the proposed strategies could facil-
itate metropolis security surveillance in different aspects.
We also studied the security surveillance problem that
high-resolution video is desired for high-quality crime
evidence, while only a limited number of placed cameras
can be of high resolution simultaneously based on game
theory. The results illustrated that, using the carefully
designed randomized strategy, we can deter a sophisti-
cated adversary with maximal utility under the constraint
of practical overhead.
To make our cities safer, there remain a lot of prob-
lems to explore. In an era of mass terrorism, we expect
our work could stimulate more research on transportation
data-driven security surveillance in smart cities.
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APPENDIX
The submodularity for S3∼S5
Proof. For the function F(C) defined in S3, given every two sets
C1,C2 ⊆Ω and C1 ⊆C2, we have
F(C1) =Φ−∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C1)+1
−1
)
/|V |
and
F(C2) =Φ−∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C2)+1
−1
)
/|V |.
Meanwhile, we add a new block c ∈Ω\C2 to C1 and C2, and obtain
F(C1 ∪{c}) =Φ−∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C1 ∪{c})+1 −1
)
/|V |
and
F(C2 ∪{c}) =Φ−∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C2 ∪{c})+1 −1
)
/|V |.
Accordingly, we obtain the function value increment as
F(C1 ∪{c})−F(C1) =
∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C1)+1
− S
Tv(C1 ∪{c})+1
)
/|V |
and
F(C2 ∪{c})−F(C2) =
∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C2)+1
− S
Tv(C2 ∪{c})+1
)
/|V |.
Recall Tv(C) denotes the amount of traffic contributed by v to blocks
in C. Because of c /∈C1 and c /∈C2, we have Tv(C1∪{c}) = Tv(C1)+
Tv({c}), and Tv(C2 ∪ {c}) = Tv(C2) + Tv({c}). Therefore, the above
equations can be rewritten as
F(C1 ∪{c})−F(C1) =
∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C1)+1
− S
Tv(C1)+1+Tv({c})
)
/|V |
and
F(C2 ∪{c})−F(C2) =
∑
v∈V
(
S
Tv(C2)+1
− S
Tv(C2)+1+Tv({c})
)
/|V |.
Given C1 ⊆C2, we have Tv(C1)≤ Tv(C2) holds. Thus,(
S
Tv(C1)+1
− S
Tv(C1)+1+Tv({c})
)
≥
(
S
Tv(C2)+1
− S
Tv(C2)+1+Tv({c})
)
Finally, we derive
F(C1 ∪{c})−F(C1)≥ F(C2 ∪{c})−F(C2).
The submodularity holds for F(C) defined in S3.
Similarly, we can deduce that the submodularity holds for F(C)
defined in S4 and S5.
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